

## Report to:

# Joint Audit and Governance Committee Cabinet Council

Report of Interim Head of Finance

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To:	JOINT AUDIT AND GOVERNANCE COMMITTEE on	26 January 2021
	CABINET on	04 February 2021
	COUNCIL on	11 February 2021

## Treasury Management and Investment Strategy 2021/22

### Recommendations

That Joint Audit and Governance Committee approves each of the following key elements of this report, and recommends these to Cabinet:

1. To approve the treasury management strategy 2021/22 set out in appendix A to this report;
2. To approve the prudential indicators and limits for 2021/22 to 2023/24 as set out in, appendix A.
3. To approve the annual investment strategy 2021/22 set out in appendix A, and the lending criteria detailed in table 6.

That Cabinet considers any comments from committee and recommends Council to approve report.

## Purpose of report

1. This report presents the council's Treasury Management Strategy (TMS) for 2021/22. This sets out how the council's treasury service will support financing of capital investment decisions, and how treasury management operates day to day. It sets out the limitations on treasury management activity informed by the prudential indicators, within which the council's treasury function must operate. The strategy is included as appendix A to the report. This report includes the three elements required by legislation as follows:
  - The **prudential indicators** required by the CIPFA Prudential Code 2017 for Capital Finance in Local Authorities and CIPFA TM code of Practice 2017;
  - The **annual investment strategy**. This sets out the council's criteria for selecting counterparties and limiting exposure to the risk of loss on its investments.
  - A statutory duty to approve a **minimum revenue provision** policy statement. (appendix A, paragraphs 14-18).

It is a requirement of the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management 2017 that this report is approved by full Council on an annual basis.

## Strategic objectives

2. Managing the finances of the authority in accordance with the treasury management strategy will help to ensure that resources are available to deliver its services and meet the council's strategic objectives.

## Background

3. Treasury management is the planning of the council's cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.
4. The funding of the council's capital expenditure is also a function of treasury management. The capital programme provides a guide to the funding needs of the council and informs long-term cash flow plans to ensure that the council can meet its capital spending obligations.
5. Treasury investments are effectively what the council does with its cash resources before it is spent on the provision of services and the funding of the capital programme. All expenditure of a capital nature is managed through the council's capital programme and is not covered by this report.
6. The treasury management and annual investment strategy set out the council's policies for managing investments and confirms the council gives priority to the security and liquidity of those investments. It also includes the prudential indicators for the next three years; these demonstrate that the council's capital

investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

7. The council’s treasury management strategy 2021/22 is attached in appendix A. Whilst every attempt has been made to minimise the technical content of this report, it is, by its very nature and the need for compliance with associated guidance, technical in parts. A glossary of terms in appendix G should aid members understanding of some technical terms used in the report.
8. The last significant review by CIPFA of its ‘Prudential code’ and the ‘Treasury Management Code of Practice’ was in 2017.

**Recommended changes to the treasury management strategy**

9. Council approved the 2020/21 treasury management strategy on 13 February 2020. The proposed strategy for 2021/22 includes the changes detailed below, which cabinet is asked to recommend to council.

**Counterparty limits**

10. On 31 March 2020 the Interim Head of Finance waived financial procedure rule 53 and allowed the councils to over-ride their counter party limits for money market funds. This was to allow the councils to deal with the receipt of unprecedented levels of government grant funding to fund the business grant schemes administered by the councils on behalf of the government.
11. Delegation 2.7 of the council constitutions allows the Interim Head of Finance, in consultation with the cabinet member for finance, to raise counterparty limits by £3,000,000 within a financial year.
12. Officers believe the same temporary increases will be required for the first half of 2021/22. The increased limits on specific counterparties are set out in the table below.

Counterparty	Amount required £m
West Bromwich Building Society	3
Newcastle Building Society	3
Nottingham Building Society	3
National Counties Building Society	3
Progressive Building Society	3
Monmouthshire Building Society	3
Furness Building Society	3
Goldman Sachs Money Market Fund	10

**Financial implications and risk assessment**

13. This report and all associated policies and strategies set out clearly the parameters the council must work within. It is important that the council follows

the approved treasury management strategy which is designed to help protect the council's finances by managing its risk exposure.

14. Link Treasury Services has provided a counterparty methodology, but given the council's balances, we have expanded on this methodology to include Building Societies to ensure a diversified portfolio.

15. Base rate is currently 0.10 per cent. It dropped from 0.25 per cent to 0.10 per cent on 19 March 2020 to help control the economic shock of coronavirus. The Bank of England had dropped base rate from 0.75 per cent to 0.25 per cent one week earlier on 11 March 2020.

16. Link Treasury Services forecast that the bank base rate will not increase before March 2024.

17. The table below gives an estimate of the investment income achievable for the next five years;

<b>Table 1: Medium term investment income forecast</b>					
	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26
	£000's	£000's	£000's	£000's	£000's
Forecast as at December 2020	1,847	1,819	1,709	1,796	1,796

The 2021/22 budget setting report and medium-term financial plan will take into account the latest projections of anticipated investment income.

**Legal implications**

18. There are no significant legal implications as a result of the recommendations in this report. Compliance with the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services, the CLG Local Government Investment Guidance provides assurance that the council's investments are, and will continue to be, within its legal powers.

19. The council must approve any amendment to the treasury management strategy and annual investment strategy in accordance with the Local Government Act 2003 (the Act), the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services and the CLG Local Government Investment Guidance under Section 15(1) (a) Local Government Act 2003 and CIPFA Prudential Code for Capital Finance.

**Conclusion**

20. This report introduces the treasury management strategy and the annual investment strategy for 2021/22 which are appended to this report, together with the prudential indicators for approval to council. These documents provide the parameters within which the council's treasury management function will operate.

**Background papers**

- CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management 2017
- CIPFA Prudential Code 2017
- CIPFA Treasury Management in the Public Services Guidance Notes 2018
- CIPFA statement 17.10.18 on borrowing in advance of need and investments in commercial properties
- CIPFA Bulletin 02 Treasury and Capital Management Update October 2018
- Statutory Guidance on Local Government Investments (3rd Edition)
- Statutory Guidance on Minimum Revenue Provision

## **Appendices**

Appendix A Treasury Management Strategy 2021/22

Appendix B Economic Background

Appendix C Risk and performance benchmarking

Appendix D Explanation of Prudential and Treasury Indicators

Appendix E TMP1 extract

Appendix F Extension to the responsibilities of the S151 officer

Appendix G Glossary of terms

## Appendix A

### Treasury Management Strategy 2021/22

#### Introduction

1. The first main function of the treasury management services is to ensure the council's cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return. The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the council's capital plans.
2. Whilst any commercial initiatives or loans to third parties will impact on the treasury function, these activities are generally classed as non-treasury activities, (arising usually from capital expenditure), and are separate from the day to day treasury management activities.
3. CIPFA defines treasury management as:

*“The management of the local authority’s borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”*

4. Revised reporting was required for the 2019/20 reporting cycle due to revisions of the Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (MHCLG) Investment Guidance, the MHCLG Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Guidance, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance & Accountancy (CIPFA) Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code. The primary reporting changes included the introduction of a capital strategy, to provide a longer-term focus to the capital plans, and greater reporting requirements surrounding any commercial activity undertaken under the Localism Act 2011. The capital strategy is reported separately.

#### Treasury Management reporting

5. The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main treasury reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.
  - a) Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy (this report) - The first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:
    - the capital plans, (including prudential indicators);
    - a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy, (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
    - the treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are managed), including treasury indicators; and
    - an investment strategy, (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

- b) A mid-year treasury management report – This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the mid-year treasury performance, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.
- c) An annual treasury report – This report reviews performance for the previous financial year and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

### **Scrutiny**

- 6. The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Joint Audit and Governance Committee.

### **Treasury Management Strategy for 2021/22**

- 7. The strategy for 2021/22 covers the areas below:
  - the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators;
  - the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.
  - the current treasury position;
  - treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
  - prospects for interest rates;
  - the borrowing strategy;
  - policy on borrowing in advance of need;
  - debt rescheduling;
  - the investment strategy;
  - creditworthiness policy; and
  - the policy on use of external service providers.
- 8. These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003 (the Act), the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

### **Councillor and officer training**

- 9. The CIPFA Code requires the Interim Head of Finance to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny. The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

### **Capital Prudential Indicators**

- 10. The Council's capital expenditure plans (as detailed in the council's capital programme) are a key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

### **Treasury management advisors**

11. The Council uses Link Asset Services, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.
12. The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisors.
13. It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills, knowledge and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented and subjected to regular review.

### **Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) policy statement 2021/22**

14. The council's current capital programme will primarily be financed from internal resources. If borrowing is undertaken, then the council will be required by statute to set aside funds in the annual revenue budget to amortise the principal element of any borrowing – this is the MRP. There will also be a requirement to set aside revenue budget for the interest payments on any borrowing raised. Loans will generally be taken over the life of the assets being financed and amortised accordingly.
15. The council is required by regulation to approve an annual MRP policy before the start of the year to which it relates. Any in-year changes must also be submitted to the council for approval.
16. A variety of options are provided to councils for the calculation of MRP. The council has chosen the "asset life method" as being most appropriate. Using this method MRP will be based on the estimated life of the asset, in accordance with the regulations (this option must be applied for any expenditure capitalised under a Capitalisation Direction). Repayments included in annual PFI or finance leases are applied as MRP.
17. Currently, the council's MRP liability is nil. This will remain the case unless capital expenditure is financed by external or internal borrowing.
18. The Interim Head of Finance will determine the most appropriate repayment method, term of borrowing and duration of borrowing. As a general illustration, Table 1 below gives an example of the annual revenue costs associated with borrowing an amount of £2.5 million over a 50-year period, based on the current district tax base of 59,171.2 Band D equivalents:



Table 1: Example MRP and interest calculation		
Loan Amount	£2,500,000	
Loan Duration	50 Years	
PWLB Interest	1.38%	
2021/22 Tax Base	59,171	
	£	£ per Band D
MRP Element	£50,000	0.88
Annual Interest Cost	£34,500	0.58
<b>Total</b>	<b>£84,500</b>	<b>1.43</b>

**Prospects for interest rate forecast and economic rate forecasts**

19. The following table Link Asset Services’ central view on expected interest rate movements out to March 2024. It should be read alongside the commentary provided below.

**Table 2: interest rate forecasts - Quoted by link Asset Services December 2020**

Bank Rate															
	NOW	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
Link Group	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%
Capital Economics	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	-	-	-	-	-
5yr PWLB Rate															
	NOW	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
Link Group	0.84%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.80%	0.90%	0.90%	0.90%	0.90%	0.90%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%
Capital Economics	0.84%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	-	-	-	-	-
10yr PWLB Rate															
	NOW	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
Link Group	1.15%	1.10%	1.10%	1.10%	1.10%	1.20%	1.20%	1.20%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%	1.20%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%
Capital Economics	1.15%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%	1.30%	-	-	-	-	-
25yr PWLB Rate															
	NOW	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
Link Group	1.70%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%
Capital Economics	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%	1.80%	-	-	-	-	-
50yr PWLB Rate															
	NOW	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
Link Group	1.54%	1.30%	1.30%	1.40%	1.40%	1.40%	1.40%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%	1.60%
Capital Economics	1.54%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	1.70%	-	-	-	-	-

20. The fall in GDP in the first half of 2020, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, of 28 per cent was revised upwards to 23 per cent. This is still one of the largest falls in output of any developed nation but is only to be expected as the UK economy is heavily skewed towards consumer facing services, which were particularly vulnerable to being damaged by lockdown.

21. The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) still expects the £300 billion of QE purchases announced between the March and June meetings to continue until the “turn of the year”. This implies that the pace of purchases will slow further to about £4 billion a week, down from £14 billion a week at the height of the crisis and £7 billion more recently.
22. The pace of recovery is not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. There will also be some painful longer-term adjustments as office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover their previous level of use for several years or possibly ever. There is also likely to be a reversal of globalisation as this crisis has shown how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, digital services is one area that has already seen huge growth.

### **Negative interest rates**

23. While the Bank of England has said that it is unlikely to introduce a negative Bank Rate, at least in the next 6 -12 months, some deposit accounts are already offering negative rates for shorter periods. As part of the response to the pandemic and lockdown, the Bank and the Government have provided financial markets and businesses with plentiful access to credit, either directly or through commercial banks. In addition, as with our councils, the Government has provided large sums of grants to local authorities to help deal with the COVID crisis, causing sudden large increases in investment balances searching for an investment home, some of which was only very short term until those sums were able to be passed on.
24. As for money market funds (MMFs), yields have continued to drift lower. Some managers have suggested that they might resort to trimming fee levels to ensure that net yields for investors remain in positive territory where possible and practical. Investor cash flow uncertainty, and the need to maintain liquidity in these unprecedented times, has meant there is a glut of money swilling around at the very short end of the market. This has seen a number of market operators, now including the DMADF, offer nil or negative rates for very short-term maturities. This is not universal, and MMFs are still offering a marginally positive return, as are a number of financial institutions.
25. Inter-local authority lending and borrowing rates have also declined due to the surge in the levels of cash seeking a short-term home at a time when many local authorities are probably having difficulties over accurately forecasting when disbursements of funds received will occur or when further large receipts will be received from the Government.
26. Although the Bank of England has seemingly ruled out using negative interest rates for now, it has recently written to all UK banks and building societies, as well as large international banks and insurers, asking them to identify any operational challenges associated with implementation of zero or negative bank rate. It suggested that while negative rates can work in some circumstances, it would be “less effective as a tool to stimulate the economy” at this time when banks are worried about future loan losses. It also has “other instruments available”, including quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance.

27. A move to negative interest rates will see treasury investment income fall. We are predicting that South will not reach their budgeted income levels for this year due to the drop in interest rates already experienced, and both councils will see a reduction in investment income in future years that will need to be built into future years budgets.
28. There is a risk that the cash the councils hold short term for working capital will attract nominal interest charges. However, we will mitigate this risk by investing the remaining balances longer term where possible, and also potentially making more use of notice accounts.
29. We will continue to maintain a close dialogue with our treasury advisors (Link Treasury Services) and we will continue to work pro-actively in accordance with our treasury strategy to minimise any adverse impact on investment returns that may result in the event of bank rate becoming negative.

### **Treasury Limits for 2021/22 to 2023/24**

30. It is a statutory duty, under Section 3 of the Act and supporting regulations for the council to determine and keep under review how much it can afford to borrow. The amount so determined is called the “Affordable Borrowing Limit”. The Authorised Limit is the legislative limit specified in the Act.
31. The council must have regard to the Prudential Code when setting the Authorised Limit, which essentially requires it to ensure that total capital expenditure remains within sustainable limits and, that the impact upon its future council tax is ‘acceptable’.
32. The Authorised Limit is set on a rolling basis, for the forthcoming financial year and two successive financial years.
33. The following indicators set the parameters within which we manage the overall capital investment and treasury management functions. There are specific treasury activity limits, which aim to contain the activity of the treasury function in order to manage risk and reduce the impact of an adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive, they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs/improve performance. The limits are set out in table 3 below.

Cabinet is asked to recommend council to approve the limits:

<b>Table 3: Prudential indicators</b>				
	<b>2020/21</b>	<b>2021/22</b>	<b>2022/23</b>	<b>2023/24</b>
	<b>Approved</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Estimate</b>	<b>Estimate</b>
	<b>£m</b>	<b>£m</b>	<b>£m</b>	<b>£m</b>
<b>Debt</b>				
<b>Authorised limit for external debt</b>				
Borrowing	30	30	30	30
Other long-term liabilities	0	0	0	0
	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Operational boundary for external debt</b>				
Borrowing	25	25	25	25
Other long-term liabilities	0	0	0	0
	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Interest rate exposures</b>				
Maximum fixed rate borrowing	100%	100%	100%	100%
Maximum variable rate borrowing	100%	100%	100%	100%
<b>Investments</b>				
<b>Interest rate exposures</b>				
Limits on fixed interest rates	100%	100%	100%	100%
Limits on variable interest rates	50	50	50	50
<b>Principal sums invested &gt; 364 days</b>				
Upper limit for principal sums invested >364 days	70	70	70	70

**Current position**

34. The maturity structure of the council's investments at 30 November 2020 was as follows:

<b>Table 4: maturity structure of investments:</b>		
	<b>Total £000's</b>	<b>% holding</b>
Call	500	0%
Money market fund	21,632	12%
Less than 6 months	69,000	39%
6 months to 1 year	65,500	37%
1 year +	2,000	1%
CCLA - Property Fund	6,831	4%
Equities	11,779	7%
<b>Total investments</b>	<b>177,241</b>	<b>100%</b>

\* The figure for total investments shown above excludes the £15 million 20-year loan to SOHA made in 2013/14 and the balance outstanding with Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander (KSF).

\*\*£177 million does not represent uncommitted resource the council has at its disposal. This amount includes council tax receipts held prior to forwarding to Oxfordshire County Council and the Police and Crime Commissioner for the Thames Valley, business rate receipts prior to payment to the government and committed capital and revenue balances. Details of the council's uncommitted balances are provided in the annual budget and council tax setting report.

35. The council holds as above, 89 per cent of its investments in the form of cash deposits, 77 per cent is invested for fixed terms with a fixed investment return and 12 per cent on call accounts, with the remainder held in non-cash deposits. Typically, the council restricts lending activity to UK institutions and the highest rated counterparties

36. The council's considerations for investment will remain security, liquidity and yield – in that order. Officers undertaking Treasury Management will work towards the optimum profile distribution.

#### Investment performance for the year to 30 November 2020

37. The council's budgeted investment return for 2020/21 is £2.583 million, and the actual interest received to date is shown as follows:

<b>Table 5: Investment interest earned by investment type</b>				
<b>Investment type</b>	<b>Interest Earned</b>			
	<b>Annual Budget</b>	<b>Actual to date</b>	<b>Annual Forecast</b>	<b>Forecast Variation</b>
	<b>£000's</b>	<b>£000's</b>	<b>£000's</b>	<b>£000's</b>
Fixed term and call cash	1,205	185	1,270	<b>65</b>
SOHA	623	312	623	<b>0</b>
CCLA	299	135	217	<b>(82)</b>
Unit Trusts	456	64	349	<b>(107)</b>
<b>Total interest</b>	<b>2,583</b>	<b>696</b>	<b>2,459</b>	<b>(124)</b>

#### Borrowing Strategy 2021/22

38. The annual treasury management strategy must set out details of the council's borrowing requirement, any maturing debt which will need to be re-financed, and the effect this will have on the treasury position over the next three years. This council currently has no external debt and in general, the council will borrow for one of two purposes:

- to support cash flow in the short-term;
- To fund capital investment over the medium to long term.

39. Any borrowing undertaken will be within the scope of the boundaries given in the prudential indicators shown in Table 3, which allow for the council to borrow up to a maximum of £30 million, if such a need arose. This also allows short-term borrowing for the cash flow management activities of the authority.
40. The existing capital programme can be financed from internal resources. If additional expenditure was committed in the future, a decision would have to be made at the time as to how it would be funded taking into account the prudential borrowing criteria. Any decision on borrowing will be taken by the Interim Head of Finance based on the optimum cost to the council.
41. Any borrowing for capital financing purposes will be assessed by the Interim Head of Finance to be prudent, sustainable and affordable
42. This strategy allows the Interim Head of Finance to determine the most suitable repayment terms of any borrowing to demonstrate affordability and sustainability in the medium-term financial plan if required. As a rule, the term of any borrowing will not be longer than the expected life of the capital asset being created.

**Policy on borrowing in advance of need**

43. The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.
44. Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

**Annual investment strategy 2021/22**

45. The MHCLG and CIPFA have extended their definition of ‘investments’ to include both financial and non-financial investments. This report deals solely with financial investments, (as managed by the treasury management team). Non-financial investments, essentially the purchase of income yielding assets, are covered in the Capital Strategy (a separate report).
46. The Council’s investment policy has regard to the following: -
  - MHCLG’s Guidance on Local Government Investments (“the Guidance”)
  - CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 (“the Code”)
  - CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018
47. The Council’s investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return).
48. The primary aim of the council’s investment strategy is to maintain the security and liquidity of its investments; yield or return on the investment will be a

secondary consideration, subject to prudent security and liquidity. The council will ensure:

- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments to cover cash flow. For this purpose, it has set out parameters for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed.
- It maintains a policy covering the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security.

49. The strategy aims to provide a high degree of flexibility to take appropriate lending decisions, with a view to producing a portfolio with an even spread of maturity periods. This aim is to provide a more even and predictable investment return in the medium term.

50. The council's Interim Head of Finance will ensure a counterparty list (a list of named institutions) is maintained in compliance with the recommended credit rating criteria (table 5) and will revise the criteria and submit any changes to the credit rating criteria to council for approval as necessary.

### **Investment types**

51. The types of investment that the council can use are summarised below. These are split under the headings of 'specified' and 'non-specified' in accordance with the statutory guidance.

### **Specified investment instruments**

52. These are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity, or those where the council has the right to be repaid within 12 months if it wishes. These would include sterling investments with:

- UK government Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility (DMADF)
- UK government – treasury stock (Gilts) with less than one year to maturity
- Supranational bonds of less than one year's duration
- Deposits with UK local authorities
- Pooled investment vehicles such as Money Market Funds (MMF) (AAA rated)
- Deposits with banks and building societies (minimum F1/A- rated)
- Certificates of deposits issued by banks and building societies (minimum rating as above)

### **Non-specified investment instruments**

53. These are any other type of investment (i.e. investments not defined as specified, above). Examples of non-specified investments include any sterling investments with:

- Supranational bonds of 1 to 10 years to maturity
- UK treasury stock (Gilts) with a maturity of 1 to 10 years
- Unrated building societies (minimum asset value £1 billion)

- Bank and building society cash deposits up to 5 years (minimum F1/A-rated)
- Deposits with UK local authorities up to 25 years to maturity
- Corporate bonds
- Pooled property, pooled bond funds and UK pooled equity funds
- Diversified Income Fund
- Multi-Asset Fund
- Ultra-Dated/Short dated bond
- Non-UCITS Retail Schemes (NURS)

**Other Non-specified investment instruments.**

54. Other non-specified investment instruments include:

- Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities

**Approach to investing**

55. The council holds over £100 million core cash balances which are available to invest for more than one year. This is expected to reduce over the medium term as the approved capital expenditure is incurred and to fund the revenue budget shortfall. In addition, the council has funds that are available on a temporary basis to invest. These are held pending payment over to another body such as precept payments and council tax. The amount can be up to £22 million throughout the year and should only be invested short term (under one year). Investments will be made with reference to known cash flow requirements (liquidity).

56. The council's investment methodology includes the use of building societies. This is not in line with the Link Asset Services methodology, however in order that the council maintains a diversified portfolio, building societies have been included in the treasury management strategy.

57. While rates remain historically low the council will aim to keep investments relatively short term but will continue to look for opportunities to fix lending in the medium term with highly rated institutions when possible for core cash balances. The aim is to increase the weighted average maturity of the portfolio in order to reduce maturity risk.

58. Officers will continue to provide tight controls on the investments placed. Where possible, opportunities to spread the investment risk over different types of instruments will be considered.

59. Should market conditions deteriorate suddenly to the extent that the council is unable to place money with institutions with the necessary credit rating, it will make use of the UK Government deposit account (DMADF).

60. The council has the authority to lend to other local authorities at market rates. Whilst investments with other local authorities are considered to be supported by central government, officers will consider the financial viability and sustainability of the individual local authority before any funds are advanced.



61. Further investment in property funds will be looked at in more detail for consideration. In 2013/14 the council invested £5 million in the Churches Charities and Local Authorities pooled property investment fund (CCLA).
62. Money market funds are mainly used for liquidity; they also provide security and spread portfolio risk. Officers will always monitor the council's exposure to these funds in order to manage our security risk.
63. Currently the council does not make use of an external fund manager. Whilst there are presently no plans for this situation to change, this will continue to be kept under review.
64. Bond funds can be used to diversify the portfolio, whilst maintaining an element of liquidity and security. These will be considered and reviewed as an investment possibility to spread portfolio risk.
65. One option to offer diversification in the council's investment portfolio would be to make use of Ultra Short Dated / Short Dated Bond Funds (USDBF / SDBFs). Possible use of such funds would be intended for longer term investments than with traditional money market funds (i.e. for possible investment durations of three – six months).
66. Unlike money market funds USDBF/SDBF have a variable net asset value (VNAV). This means the assets are 'marked to market' (re-valued to current market value) on a daily basis and the fund unit price adjusted accordingly. Under this calculation basis the unit price fluctuates and could, therefore, be higher or lower than the original investment when it is redeemed. Any use of the above funds would be restricted to the high-quality counterparty credit criteria as set out in Table 5 below.
67. The council does not currently make use of certificates of deposit. Consideration will be given to their use to assist diversification of the investment portfolio. Certificates of deposit have the same level of ranking and security as ordinary fixed term deposits but have the option of being traded before maturity. Certificates of deposit are bought and sold on the stock market and their price can go up or down prior to their redemption date. If held to maturity the investment will return their issue value. The council would only normally look to enter such investments on a held to maturity basis.

### **Counterparty selection**

68. Treasury management risk is the risk of loss of capital to the council. To minimise this risk, the council uses credit rating information when considering who to lend to. Link Asset Services provide the council with credit rating updates from all three ratings agencies – Standard & Poors, Fitch and Moodys.
69. The council will not use the approach suggested by CIPFA of using the lowest rating from all three rating agencies in evaluating investment opportunity. This is because adopting this approach could leave the council with too few counterparties for the strategy to be workable. Instead, counterparty investment limits will be set by reference to all the assigned ratings.

70. Where counterparties fail to meet the minimum required criteria (Table 6 below) they will be omitted from the counterparty list. Any rating changes and rating watches (notification of a rating change under consideration) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur, and this information is considered before any deal is entered into. Extreme market movements may result in a downgrade of an institution or removal from the council's lending list.

71. Additional requirements under the CIPFA Treasury Management Code require the council to supplement the credit rating data with operational market information such as credit default swaps (CDS), negative watches and outlooks, which are considered when assessing the security of counterparties. This additional information is used so that the council does not rely solely on the current credit ratings of counterparties.

72. Where it is felt the council would benefit from utilising government guarantees provided by countries with a AAA rating, the council may lend to institutions covered by such guarantees. Any decision to lend in this way will be subject to consultation with the agreement of the cabinet member responsible for finance.

### **Country and sector considerations**

73. The council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties outside the UK from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AAA from Fitch Ratings.

### **Counterparty limits**

74. In the normal course of the council's cash flow operations it is expected that both specified and non-specified investments will be used for the control of liquidity as both categories allow for short term investments. The use of longer-term instruments (greater than one year from inception to repayment) will fall in the non-specified investment category. These instruments will be used where the council's liquidity requirements are safeguarded. The council will lend to institutions that meet the following criteria:

<b>Table 6: Counterparty Limits</b>				
<b>Counterparty</b>	<b>Minimum Fitch Long Counterparty</b>			<b>Maximum</b>
	<b>term Rating ( or equivalent)</b>	<b>Limit £m</b>	<b>Max. maturity period</b>	
Institutions with a minimum rating:	F1+ / AA-	£15m	4 years	25%
Institutions with a minimum rating:	F1+ / A+	£15m	3 years	25%
Institutions with a minimum rating:	F1 / A	£15m	2 years	30%
Institutions with a minimum rating:	F1 / A-	£15m	1 year	50%
Banks - part nationalised UK	UK sovereign	£20m	4 years	100%
Building societies - assets > £5bn	n/a	£10m	12 months	70%
Building societies - assets > £3bn	n/a	£8m	12 months	60%
Building societies - assets > £1bn	n/a	£6m	12 months	50%
Building Societies	BBB+	£15m	12 Months	50%
Local authorities , parish councils	n/a	£20m	25 years	50%
Money Market funds (CNAV)	AAA	£20m	liquid	100%
Pooled bond fund	F1+/A+	£5m	Variable	10%
Pooled property fund	n/a	£10m	Variable	15%
CCLA Diversified Income Fund	n/a	£10m	Variable	15%
Multi - Asset Funds	n/a	£10m	Variable	15%
Ultra Dated/Short dated bonds	n/a	£10m	Variable	15%
Property related Investments	n/a	£30m	Variable	80%
Corporate Bonds	F1+/A+	£5m	Variable	10%
Non-UCITS Retail Scheme (NURS)	n/a	£5m	Variable	50%
Managed Bond Funds	F1/A-	£15m	Variable	15%
Share capital / Equities (UK)	n/a	£10m	Variable	20%
Supranationals	AAA	£10m	Variable	20%
UK Government - gilts	UK sovereign	£15m	15 years	10%
UK Government - DMADF	UK sovereign	No limit	n/a	100%
UK Government - Treasury Bills	UK sovereign	£15m	15 years	10%

75. The criteria for choosing counterparties provides a sound approach to investment. Whilst councillors are asked to approve the criteria in table 5, under exceptional market conditions the interim head of finance may temporarily restrict further investment activity to those counterparties considered of higher credit quality than the minimum criteria set out for approval.

76. On 31 March 2020 the Interim Head of Finance waived financial procedure rule 53 and allowed the councils to over-ride their counter party limits for money market funds. This was to allow the councils to deal with the receipt of unprecedented levels of government grant funding to fund the business grant schemes administered by the councils on behalf of the government.

77. Delegation 2.7 of the council constitutions allows the Interim Head of Finance, in consultation with the cabinet member for finance, to raise counterparty limits by £3,000,000 within a financial year.

78. Officers believe the same temporary increases will be required for the first half of 2021/22. The increased limits on specific counterparties are set out in the table below.

Counterparty	Amount required £m
West Bromwich Building Society	3
Newcastle Building Society	3
Nottingham Building Society	3
National Counties Building Society	3
Progressive Building Society	3
Monmouthshire Building Society	3
Furness Building Society	3
Goldman Sachs Money Market Fund	10

### Fund managers

79. The council does not currently employ any external fund managers. However, in the event of such an appointment, appointees will comply with this and subsequent treasury strategies. This strategy empowers the Section 151 officer to appoint such an external manager to manage a proportion of the council's investment portfolio if this is advantageous. Situations in which this might be advantageous include benchmarking the performance of the treasury team; benefiting from the often-extensive credit risk and economic modelling resources of external fund managers and resources necessary to hold liquid instruments for trading.

### Risk and performance benchmarks

80. A requirement of the Code is that security and liquidity benchmarks are considered and approved. This is in addition to yield benchmarks which are used to assess performance. The benchmarks are guidelines (not limits) so may be breached depending on the movement in interest rates and counterparty criteria. Their purpose is to allow officers to monitor the current trend position and amend the operational strategy depending on any changes. Any breach of the benchmarks will be reported, with an explanation in the mid-year or annual report to audit and corporate governance committee. Detailed information for the assessment of risk is shown in appendix C.

81. Performance indicators are set to assess the adequacy of the treasury function over the year. These are distinct historic performance indicators, as opposed to the predominantly forward-looking prudential indicators. The indicators used to assess the performance of the treasury function are:

- Cash investments - 3-month LIBID rate.
- Property related investments – IPD Balance Property Unit Trust Index.
- Equities – FTSE all shares index

82. The results of these indicators will be reported in both the annual mid-year and year end treasury reports.

### **Policy on the use of treasury management advisors**

83. The council has a joint contract for treasury management advisors with Vale of White Horse District Council. Link Asset Services provides a range of services which include:

- technical support on treasury matters, capital finance issues, statutory reports;
- economic forecasts and interest rate analysis;
- credit ratings / market information service involving the three-main credit rating agencies;
- strategic advice including a review of the investment and borrowing strategies and policy documents.

84. The council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers. It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills, resources and up to date market information.

### **Treasury management scheme of delegation and the role of the Section 151 officer**

85. **Council**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.

86. **Joint Audit and Governance Committee/ Cabinet**

- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations;
- Ensuring effective scrutiny of the treasury management function

87. **Section 151 Officer/ Interim Head of Finance**

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- Approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

88. The above list of specific responsibilities of the S151 officer in the 2017 Treasury Management Code has not changed. However, implicit in the changes in both codes, is a major extension of the functions of this role, especially in respect of non-financial investments, (which CIPFA has defined as being part of treasury management), this is detailed in appendix F.

**Summary**

89. Prior to the beginning of each financial year the council must approve the treasury management strategy. The strategy sets the parameters within which officers can manage the council's cash flows and invest any surplus funds.

90. This strategy provides a commentary on the current financial climate and sets out the council's lending strategy in response to this.

## Appendix B

### ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

The following was provided by our advisors, Link Asset Services, during November 2020.

- **UK.** The Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee kept **Bank Rate** unchanged on 5<sup>th</sup> November. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a second national lockdown from 5<sup>th</sup> November to 2<sup>nd</sup> December which is obviously going to put back economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. It therefore decided to do a further tranche of **quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn**, to start in January when the current programme of £300bn of QE announced in March to June, runs out. It did this so that "announcing further asset purchases now should support the economy and help to ensure the unavoidable near-term slowdown in activity was not amplified by a tightening in monetary conditions that could slow the return of inflation to the target".
- Its forecasts appeared, at the time, to be rather optimistic in terms of three areas:
  - The economy would recover to reach its pre-pandemic level in Q1 2022
  - The Bank also expects there to be excess demand in the economy by Q4 2022.
  - CPI inflation is therefore projected to be a bit above its 2 per cent target by the start of 2023 and the "inflation risks were judged to be balanced".
- Significantly, there was no mention of **negative interest rates** in the minutes or Monetary Policy Report, suggesting that the MPC remains some way from being persuaded of the case for such a policy, at least for the next 6 -12 months. However, rather than saying that it "stands ready to adjust monetary policy", the MPC this time said that it will take "whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit". The latter seems stronger and wider and may indicate the Bank's willingness to embrace new tools.
- One key addition to **the Bank's forward guidance** in August was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that "it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2 per cent target sustainably". That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2 per cent in a couple of years' time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. Our Bank Rate forecast currently shows no increase through to quarter 1 2024 but there could well be no increase during the next five years due to the slow rate of recovery of the economy and the need for the Government to see the burden of the elevated debt to GDP ratio falling significantly. **Inflation** is unlikely to pose a threat requiring increases in Bank Rate during this period as there is likely to be spare capacity in the economy for a considerable time. It is expected to briefly peak at around 2 per cent towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short-lived factor and so not a concern.
- However, the minutes did contain several references to **downside risks**. The MPC reiterated that the "recovery would take time, and the risks around the GDP projection were judged to be skewed to the downside". It also said "the risk of a more persistent period of elevated unemployment remained material". Downside risks could well include severe restrictions remaining in place in some form during the rest of December and most of January too. That could involve some or all of the lockdown being extended beyond 2<sup>nd</sup> December, a temporary relaxation of restrictions over Christmas, a resumption of the lockdown in January and lots of regions being subject to Tier 3 restrictions when the lockdown ends. Hopefully, restrictions should progressively ease during the spring. It is only to be expected that some businesses that have barely survived the first lockdown, will fail to survive the second lockdown, especially those businesses that depend on a surge of business in the run up to Christmas each year.

This will mean that there will be some level of further permanent loss of economic activity, although the extension of the furlough scheme to the end of 31<sup>st</sup> March will limit the degree of damage done.

- As for **upside risks**, we have been waiting expectantly for news that various **COVID19 vaccines** would be cleared as being safe and effective for administering to the general public. The Pfizer announcement on 9<sup>th</sup> November was very encouraging as its 90 per cent effectiveness was much higher than the 50-60 per cent rate of effectiveness of flu vaccines which might otherwise have been expected. However, their phase three trials are still only two-thirds complete. More data needs to be collected to make sure there are no serious side effects. We don't know exactly how long immunity will last or whether it is effective across all age groups. The Pfizer vaccine specifically also has demanding cold storage requirements of minus 70C that might make it more difficult to roll out. However, the logistics of production and deployment can surely be worked out over the next few months.
- However, there has been even further encouraging news since then with another two vaccines announcing high success rates. Together, these three announcements have enormously boosted confidence that **life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021**, with activity in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels returning to their pre-pandemic levels, which would help to bring the unemployment rate down. With the household saving rate currently being exceptionally high, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for these services. A comprehensive roll-out of vaccines might take into late 2021 to fully complete; but if these vaccines prove to be highly effective, then there is a possibility that restrictions could begin to be eased, possibly in Q2 2021, once vulnerable people and front-line workers had been vaccinated. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines would radically improve the economic outlook once they have been widely administered; it may allow GDP to rise to its pre-virus level a year earlier than otherwise and mean that the unemployment rate peaks at 7 per cent next year instead of 9 per cent. But while this would reduce the need for more QE and/or negative interest rates, increases in Bank Rate would still remain some years away. There is also a potential question as to whether the relatively optimistic outlook of the Monetary Policy Report was swayed by making positive assumptions around effective vaccines being available soon. It should also be borne in mind that as effective vaccines will take time to administer, economic news could well get worse before it starts getting better.
- **Public borrowing** is now forecast by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19 per cent of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PWLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9 per cent of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery.
- Overall, **the pace of recovery** was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp but after a disappointing increase in GDP of only 2.1 per cent in August, this left the economy still 9.2 per cent smaller than in February; this suggested that the economic recovery was running out of steam after recovering 64 per cent of its total fall during the crisis. The last



three months of 2020 were originally expected to show zero growth due to the impact of widespread local lockdowns, consumers probably remaining cautious in spending, and uncertainty over the outcome of the UK/EU trade negotiations concluding at the end of the year also being a headwind. However, the second national lockdown starting on 5<sup>th</sup> November for one month is expected to depress GDP by 8 per cent in November while the rebound in December is likely to be muted and vulnerable to the previously mentioned downside risks. It was expected that the second national lockdown would push back recovery of GDP to pre pandemic levels by six months and into sometime during 2023.

This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to 2 per cent of GDP without any tax increases. This would be in line with the OBR's most optimistic forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4 per cent deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital Economics forecasts assume that there is a reasonable Brexit deal and also that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, (perverse!), depress economic growth and recovery.

- Capital Economics have not revised their forecasts for Bank Rate or gilt yields after this major revision of their forecasts for the speed of recovery of economic growth, as they are also forecasting that inflation is unlikely to be a significant threat and so gilt yields are unlikely to rise significantly from current levels.
- There will still be some **painful longer-term adjustments** as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a reversal of globalisation as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, digital services are one area that has already seen huge growth.
- The **Financial Policy Committee** (FPC) report on 6<sup>th</sup> August revised down their expected credit losses for the banking sector to "somewhat less than £80bn". It stated that in its assessment "banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC's central projection". The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC's projection, with unemployment rising to above 15 per cent.

**US.** The result of **the November elections** means that while the Democrats have gained the presidency and a majority in the House of Representatives, it looks as if the Republicans will retain their slim majority in the Senate. This means that the Democrats will not be able to do a massive fiscal stimulus, as they had been hoping to do after the elections, as they will have to get agreement from the Republicans. That would have resulted in another surge of debt issuance and could have put particular upward pressure on debt yields – which could then have also put upward pressure on gilt yields. On the other hand, equity prices leapt up on 9th November on the first news of a successful vaccine and have risen further during November as more vaccines announced successful results. This could cause a big shift in investor sentiment i.e. a swing to sell out of government debt to buy into equities which would normally be expected to cause debt prices to fall and yields to rise. However, the rise in yields has been quite muted so far and it is too early to say whether the Fed would feel it necessary to take action to suppress any further rise in debt yields. It is likely that the next two years, and possibly four years in the US, could be a political stalemate where neither party can do anything radical.

The economy had been recovering quite strongly from its contraction in 2020 of 10.2% due to the **pandemic** with GDP only 3.5 per cent below its pre-pandemic level and the unemployment rate dropping below 7 per cent. However, the rise in new cases during quarter 4, to the highest level since mid-August, suggests that the US could be in the early stages of a third wave. While the first wave in March and April was concentrated in the Northeast, and the second wave in the South and West, the latest wave has been driven by a growing outbreak in the Midwest. The latest upturn poses a threat that the recovery in the economy could stall. This is **the single biggest downside risk** to the shorter term outlook – a more widespread and severe wave of infections over the winter months, which is compounded by the impact of the regular flu season and, as a consequence, threatens to overwhelm health care facilities. Under those circumstances, states might feel it necessary to return to more draconian lockdowns.

However, with the likelihood that highly effective vaccines are going to become progressively widely administered during 2021, this should mean that life will start to return to normal during quarter 2 of 2021. Consequently, there should be a sharp pick-up in growth during that quarter and a rapid return to the pre-pandemic level of growth by the end of the year.

After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that *"it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2 per cent and was on track to moderately exceed 2 per cent for some time."* This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2 per cent target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The Fed also called on Congress to end its political disagreement over providing more support for the unemployed as there is a limit to what monetary policy can do compared to more directed central government fiscal policy. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that officials expect to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year or two beyond that. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its inflation target, other major central banks will follow. The increase in tension over the last year between the US and China is likely to lead to a lack of momentum in progressing the initial positive moves to agree a phase one trade deal. The Fed's meeting on 5 November was unremarkable - but at a politically sensitive time around the elections.

**EU.** The economy was recovering well towards the end of Q2 and into Q3 after a sharp drop in GDP caused by the virus, (e.g. France 18.9 per cent, Italy 17.6 per cent). However, growth is likely to stagnate during Q4, and Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has affected many countries, and is likely to hit hardest those countries more dependent on tourism. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the worst affected countries. With inflation expected to be unlikely to get much above 1 per cent over the next two years, the ECB has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2 per cent target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5 per cent, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. It is therefore expected that it will have to provide more monetary policy support through more quantitative easing purchases of bonds in the absence of sufficient fiscal support from governments. The current PEPP scheme of €1,350bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy.

There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support. However, the PEPP scheme is regarded as being a temporary measure during this crisis so it may need to be increased once the first PEPP runs out during early 2021. It could also decide to focus on using the Asset Purchase Programme to make more monthly purchases, rather than the PEPP scheme, and it does have other monetary policy options.

However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer, although growth will struggle during the closing and opening quarters of this year and next year respectively before it finally breaks through into strong growth in quarters 2 and 3. The ECB will now have to review whether more monetary support will be required to help recovery in the shorter term or to help individual countries more badly impacted by the pandemic.

**China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in Q2 and then into Q3 and Q4; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies.

However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.

**Japan.** Japan's success in containing the virus without imposing draconian restrictions on activity should enable a faster return to pre-virus levels of output than in many major economies. While the second wave of the virus has been abating, the economy has been continuing to recover at a reasonable pace from its earlier total contraction of 8.5 per cent in GDP. However, there now appears to be the early stages of the start of a third wave. It has also been struggling to get out of a deflation trap for many years and to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2 per cent, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. There has also been little progress on fundamental reform of the economy. The change of Prime Minister is not expected to result in any significant change in economic policy.

**World growth.** While Latin America and India have, until recently, been hotspots for virus infections, infection rates have begun to stabilise. World growth will be in recession this year. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.

Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20 per cent of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high-tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair

disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

### Summary

**Central banks are, therefore, likely to support growth by maintaining loose monetary policy through keeping rates very low for longer. Governments could also help a quicker recovery by providing more fiscal support for their economies at a time when total debt is affordable due to the very low rates of interest. They will also need to avoid significant increases in taxation or austerity measures that depress demand in their economies.**

**If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.**

### INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

**Brexit.** The interest rate forecasts provided by Link in paragraph 3.3 are predicated on an assumption of a reasonable agreement being reached on trade negotiations between the UK and the EU by 31.12.20. However, as the differences between a Brexit deal and a no deal are not as big as they once were, the economic costs of a no deal have diminished. The bigger risk is that relations between the UK and the EU deteriorate to such an extent that both sides start to unravel the agreements already put in place. So what really matters now is not whether there is a deal or a no deal, but what type of no deal it could be.

The differences between a deal and a no deal were much greater immediately after the EU Referendum in June 2016, and also just before the original Brexit deadline of 29.3.19. That's partly because leaving the EU's Single Market and Customs Union makes this Brexit a relatively "hard" one. But it's mostly because a lot of arrangements have already been put in place. Indeed, since the Withdrawal Agreement laid down the terms of the break-up, both the UK and the EU have made substantial progress in granting financial services equivalence and the UK has replicated the bulk of the trade deals it had with non-EU countries via the EU. In a no deal in these circumstances (a "cooperative no deal"), GDP in 2021 as a whole may be only 1.0 per cent lower than if there were a deal. In this situation, financial services equivalence would probably be granted during 2021 and, if necessary, the UK and the EU would probably rollover any temporary arrangements in the future.

The real risk is if the UK and the EU completely fall out. The UK could override part or all of the Withdrawal Agreement while the EU could respond by starting legal proceedings and few measures could be implemented to mitigate the disruption on 1.1.21. In such an "uncooperative no deal", GDP could be 2.5 per cent lower in 2021 as a whole than if there was a deal. The acrimony would probably continue beyond 2021 too, which may lead to fewer agreements in the future and the expiry of any temporary measures.

Relative to the slump in GDP endured during the COVID crisis, any hit from a no deal would be small. But the pandemic does mean there is less scope for policy to respond. Even so, the Chancellor could loosen fiscal policy by about £10bn (0.5 per cent of GDP) and target it at those sectors hit hardest. The Bank of England could also prop up demand, most likely through more gilt and corporate bond purchases rather than negative interest rates.

Brexit may reduce the economy's potential growth rate in the long run. However, much of that drag is now likely to be offset by an acceleration of productivity growth triggered by the digital revolution brought about by the COVID crisis.

**So in summary there is not likely to be any change in Bank Rate in 20/21 – 21/22 due to whatever outcome there is from the trade negotiations and while there will probably be some movement in gilt yields / PWLB rates after the deadline date, there will probably be minimal enduring impact beyond the initial reaction.**

### **The balance of risks to the UK**

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus and how quickly successful vaccines may become available and widely administered to the population. It may also be affected by what, if any, deal the UK agrees as part of Brexit.
- There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

### **Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:**

- **UK** - further national lockdowns or severe regional restrictions in major conurbations during 2021.
- **UK / EU trade negotiations** – if they were to cause significant economic disruption and downturn in the rate of growth.
- **UK government** takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand in the economy.
- **UK - Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**. The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact most likely for “weaker” countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions for the next year or so. However, in the case of Italy, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, which could be undermined further depending on extent of credit losses resultant of the pandemic.
- **German minority government & general election in 2021**. In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of

the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in subsequent state elections but the SPD has done particularly badly. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she intends to remain as Chancellor until the general election in 2021. This then leaves a major question mark over who will be the major guiding hand and driver of EU unity when she steps down.

- **Other minority EU governments.** Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU. In November, Hungary and Poland threatened to veto the 7 year EU budget due to the inclusion of a rule of law requirement that poses major challenges to both countries. There has also been a rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- **Geopolitical risks**, for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

### **Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates**

- **UK** - a significant rise in inflationary pressures. These could be caused by an uncooperative Brexit deal or by a stronger than currently expected recovery in the UK economy after effective vaccines are administered quickly to the UK population which leads to a resumption of normal life and a return to full economic activity across all sectors of the economy.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation.

**Post-Brexit** – if a positive agreement was reached that removed the majority of threats of economic disruption between the EU and the UK.

## Appendix C

### **Benchmarking and Monitoring Security, Liquidity and Yield in the Investment Service.**

1. These benchmarks are targets and so may be exceeded from time to time. Any variation will be reported, along with supporting reasons, in the Annual Treasury Report.

2. **Yield.** The local benchmark currently used to assess the performance of cash investments is the level of returns contrasted against the London Interbank Bid (LIBID) three-month rate. This is the interest rate a bank would be willing to pay to borrow from another bank for three months.

Property related investments are benchmarked against the IPD Balanced Property Unit Trust Index.

3. **Liquidity.** Liquidity is defined as the council “having adequate, though not excessive, cash resources, borrowing arrangements, overdrafts or standby facilities to enable it at all times to have the level of funds available to it which are necessary for the achievement of its business/service objectives” (CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice).

4. In respect of this area, the council shall seek to:

- maintain a minimal balance held in the council’s main bank account at the close of each working day. Transfers to the councils call accounts, MMF and investments will be arranged in order to achieve this, while maintaining access to adequate working capital at short notice.
- use the authorised bank overdraft facility or short-term borrowing where there is clear business case for doing so, to cover working capital requirements at short notice

### **5. Security of the investments.**

In the context of benchmarking, assessing security is very much more a subjective area to assess. Security is currently evidenced by the application of minimum credit quality criteria to investment counterparties, primarily through the use of credit ratings supplied by the three main credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s). Whilst this approach embodies security considerations, benchmarking levels of risk is more problematic. One method to benchmark security risk is to assess the historic level of default against the minimum criteria used in the Council’s investment strategy. The table beneath shows average defaults for differing periods of investment grade products for each Fitch long term rating category over the last 20-30 years.

**Average defaults for differing periods of investment**

<b>Long term rating</b>	<b>1 year</b>	<b>2 years</b>	<b>3 years</b>	<b>4 years</b>	<b>5 years</b>
AA	0.04%	0.10%	0.18%	0.27%	0.36%
A	0.05%	0.15%	0.28%	0.42%	0.59%
BBB	0.16%	0.44%	0.77%	1.15%	1.55%

6. The council's minimum long term (i.e. plus 365 day duration) rating criteria is currently "A-". For comparison, the average expectation of default for a two-year investment in a counterparty with an "A" long term rating would be 0.15 per cent of the total investment (e.g. for a £1m investment the average loss would be £1,500). **This is an average** - any specific counterparty loss is likely to be higher. These figures act as a proxy benchmark for risk across the portfolio.



## Appendix D

### **Explanation of Prudential and Treasury Indicators**

Prudential borrowing permits local government organisations to borrow to fund capital spending plans provided they could demonstrate their affordability. Prudential indicators are the means to demonstrate affordability.

**Authorised limit for external debt** – this is the maximum limit for external borrowing. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3(1) of the Local Government Act 2003. This limit is set to allow sufficient headroom for day to day operational management of cash flows.

**Operational boundary for external debt** – this is set as the more likely amount that may be required for day to day cash flow.

**Upper limit for fixed and variable interest rate exposure** – these limits allow the council flexibility in its investment and borrowing options.

**Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 365 days** – the amount it is considered can be prudently invested for periods in excess of a year

## Appendix E

### Treasury Management Practice (TMP) 1 – credit and counterparty risk management

The CLG issued Investment Guidance in 2010, and this forms the structure of the council's policy below.

The key aim of the guidance is to maintain the current requirement for councils to invest prudently, and that priority is given to security and liquidity before yield. In order to facilitate this objective, the guidance requires this council to have regard to the CIPFA publication Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes. In accordance with the code, the interim head of finance has produced its treasury management practices (TMPs). This part, TMP1(1), covering investment counterparty policy requires approval each year

The key requirements of both the Code and the investment guidance are to set an annual investment strategy, as part of its annual treasury strategy for the following year, covering the identification and approval of following:

- the strategy guidelines for decision making on investments, particularly non-specified investments.
- the principles to be used to determine the maximum periods for which funds can be committed.
- specified investments that the Council will use. These are high security (i.e. high credit rating, although this is defined by the Council, and no guidelines are given), and high liquidity investments in sterling and with a maturity of no more than a year.
- non-specified investments, clarifying the greater risk implications, identifying the general types of investment that may be used and a limit to the overall amount of various categories that can be held at any time.

The investment policy proposed for the Council is:

**Strategy guidelines** – The main strategy guidelines are contained in the body of the treasury strategy statement.

**Specified investments** – These investments are sterling investments of not more than one-year maturity, or those which could be for a longer period but where the Council has the right to be repaid within 12 months if it wishes. These are considered low risk assets where the possibility of loss of principal or investment income is small. These would include sterling investments which would not be defined as capital expenditure with:

- UK government Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility (DMADF)
- UK government – treasury stock (Gilts) with less than one year to maturity
- Supranational bonds of less than one year's duration
- Deposits with UK local authorities
- Pooled investment vehicles such as Money Market Funds (MMF) (AAA rated)
- Deposits with banks and building societies (minimum F1/A-)

- Certificates of deposits issued by banks and building societies (minimum rating as above) covers pooled investment vehicles, such as money market funds, rated AAA by Standard and Poor's, Moody's and / or Fitch rating agencies.

Within these bodies, and in accordance with the Code, the council has set additional criteria to set the time and amount of monies which will be invested in these bodies. These criteria are as stated in table 6 to this report.

### **Non-specified investments**

These are any other type of investment (i.e. not defined or specified above). The identification and rationale supporting the selection of these other investments and the maximum limits to be applied are as set out in Table 5.

### **Implementation in 2018/19**

In December 2017, CIPFA issued a revised Treasury Management Code of Practice and a revised Prudential Code. These revisions have particularly focused on non-treasury investments and especially on the purchase of property with a view to generating income. Such purchases could involve undertaking external borrowing to raise the cash to finance these purchases, or the use of existing cash balances.

The 2017 CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management abolished the treasury indicators on limits for fixed and variable rate exposure. However, this was on the basis that authorities would explain in words how they control interest rate risk.

### **IFRS 9**

Risk management will need to take account of the 2018/19 Accounting Code of Practice proposals for the valuation of investments. Key considerations are:

- Expected credit loss model. Whilst this should not be material for ordinary treasury investments such as bank deposits, this is likely to be challenging for some funds e.g. property funds, (and also for non-treasury management investments dealt with in the capital strategy e.g. longer dated service investments, loans to third parties or loans to subsidiaries).
- The valuation of investments previously valued under the available for sale category e.g. equity related to the "commercialism" agenda, property funds, equity funds and similar, will be changed to Fair Value through the Profit and Loss (FVPL).

Following the consultation undertaken by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG], on IFRS9 the Government has introduced a mandatory statutory override for local authorities to reverse out all unrealised fair value movements resulting from pooled investment funds. This will be effective from 1 April 2018. The statutory override applies for five years from this date. Local authorities are required to disclose the net impact of the unrealised fair value movements in a separate unusable reserve throughout the duration of the override in order for the Government to keep the override under review and to maintain a form of transparency.

## Appendix F

### Extension to the specific responsibilities of the S151 officer as per the Treasury Management code

The below list of specific responsibilities of the S151 officer in the 2017 Treasury Management Code has not changed. However, implicit in the changes in both codes, is a major extension of the functions of this role, especially in respect of non-financial investments, (which CIPFA has defined as being part of treasury management);

- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, non-financial investments and treasury management, with a long-term timeframe.
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury and non-financial investments and is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority
- ensure that the authority has appropriate legal powers to undertake expenditure on non-financial assets and their financing
- ensuring the proportionality of all investments so that the authority does not undertake a level of investing which exposes the authority to an excessive level of risk compared to its financial resources
- ensuring that an adequate governance process is in place for the approval, monitoring and ongoing risk management of all non-financial investments and long-term liabilities
- provision to members of a schedule of all non-treasury investments including material investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures, loans and financial guarantees
- ensuring that members are adequately informed and understand the risk exposures taken on by an authority
- ensuring that the authority has adequate expertise, either in house or externally provided, to carry out the above
- creation of Treasury Management Practices which specifically deal with how non treasury investments will be carried out and managed, to include the following
  - *Risk management (TMP1 and schedules), including investment and risk management criteria for any material non-treasury investment portfolios;*
  - *Performance measurement and management (TMP2 and schedules), including methodology and criteria for assessing the performance and success of non-treasury investments;*
  - *Decision making, governance and organisation (TMP5 and schedules), including a statement of the governance requirements for decision making in relation to non-treasury investments; and arrangements to*

*ensure that appropriate professional due diligence is carried out to support decision making;*

- *Reporting and management information (TMP6 and schedules), including where and how often monitoring reports are taken;*
- *Training and qualifications (TMP10 and schedules), including how the relevant knowledge and skills in relation to non-treasury investments will be arranged.*

## Appendix G

### GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<b>Authorised Limit</b>	The maximum amount of external debt at any one time in the financial year.
<b>Basis Point (BP)</b>	1/100th of 1%, i.e. 0.01%
<b>Base Rate</b>	Minimum lending rate of a bank or financial institution in the UK.
<b>Benchmark</b>	A measure against which the investment policy or performance of a fund manager can be compared.
<b>Bill of Exchange</b>	A financial instrument financing trade.
<b>Callable Deposit</b>	A deposit placed with a bank or building society at a set rate for a set amount of time. However, the borrower has the right to repay the funds on pre-agreed dates, before maturity. This decision is based on how market rates have moved since the deal was agreed. If rates have fallen the likelihood of the deposit being repaid rises, as cheaper money can be found by the borrower.
<b>Cash Fund Management</b>	Fund management is the management of an investment portfolio of cash on behalf of a private client or an institution, the receipts and distribution of dividends and interest, and all other administrative work in connection with the portfolio.
<b>Certificate of Deposit (CD)</b>	Evidence of a deposit with a specified bank or building society repayable on a fixed date. They are negotiable instruments and have a secondary market; therefore, the holder of a CD is able to sell it to a third party before the maturity of the CD.
<b>Commercial Paper</b>	Short-term obligations with maturities ranging from 2 to 270 days issued by banks, corporations and other borrowers. Such instruments are unsecured and usually discounted, although some may be interest bearing.
<b>Corporate Bond</b>	Strictly speaking, corporate bonds are those issued by companies. However, the term is used to cover all bonds other than those issued by governments in their own currencies and includes issues by companies, supranational organisations and government agencies.

<b>Counterparty</b>	Another (or the other) party to an agreement or other market contract (e.g. lender/borrower/writer of a swap/etc.)
<b>CDS</b>	Credit Default Swap – a swap designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income products between parties. The buyer of a credit swap receives credit protection, whereas the seller of the swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the product. By doing this, the risk of default is transferred from the holder of the fixed income security to the seller of the swap.
<b>CFR</b>	Capital Financing Requirement.
<b>CIPFA</b>	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy.
<b>CLG</b>	Department for Communities and Local Government.
<b>Derivative</b>	A contract whose value is based on the performance of an underlying financial asset, index or other investment, e.g. an option is a derivative because its value changes in relation to the performance of an underlying stock.
<b>DMADF</b>	Deposit Account offered by the Debt Management Office, guaranteed by the UK government.

<b>ECB</b>	European Central Bank – sets the central interest rates in the EMU area. The ECB determines the targets itself for its interest rate setting policy; this is to keep inflation within a band of 0 to 2 per cent. It does not accept that monetary policy is to be used to manage fluctuations in unemployment and growth caused by the business cycle.
<b>Enhanced Cash Funds</b>	A pooled investment fund. Longer dated investment than a MMF and, unlike an MMF, enhanced cash funds have variable asset value. Assets are marked to market on a daily basis and the unit prices vary accordingly. Investments can be withdrawn on a notice basis (the length of which depends on the fund) although such funds would typically be used for investments of 3 to 6 month duration.
<b>Equity</b>	A share in a company with limited liability. It generally enables the holder to share in the profitability of the company through dividend payments and capital gain.
<b>Forward Deal</b>	The act of agreeing today to deposit funds with an institution for an agreed time limit, on an agreed future date, at an agreed rate.
<b>Forward Deposits</b>	Same as forward dealing (above).

<b>Fiscal Policy</b>	The government policy on taxation and welfare payments.
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product.
<b>Gilt</b>	Registered British government securities giving the investor an absolute commitment from the government to honour the debt that those securities represent.
<b>Mark to Market Accounting</b>	Accounting on the basis of the “fair value” of an asset or liability, based on the current market price. As a result, values will change with market conditions.
<b>Minimum Revenue Provision</b>	This is a prudent sum set aside each year to offset the principal repayment of any loan to smooth the impact on the local taxpayer.
<b>Money Market Fund</b>	A well rated, highly diversified pooled investment vehicle whose assets mainly comprise of short-term instruments. It is very similar to a unit trust, however an MMF relies on loans to companies rather than share holdings.
<b>Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)</b>	Government body that sets the bank rate (commonly referred to as being base rate). Their primary target is to keep inflation within plus or minus 1 per cent of a central target of 2.5 per cent in two years’ time from the date of the monthly meeting of the committee. Their secondary target is to support the government in maintaining high and stable levels of growth and employment.
<b>Non-UCITS Retail Scheme (NURS) –</b>	Undertakings for collective investments are funds authorised to be sold in the UK that are required to meet standards set by the UK services regulator. An example is property funds.
<b>Operational Boundary</b>	The most likely, prudent but not worst-case scenario of external debt at any one time.
<b>Other Bonds</b>	Pooled funds investing in a wide range of bonds.
<b>PWLB</b>	Public Works Loan Board.
<b>QE</b>	Quantitative Easing.
<b>Retail Price Index</b>	Measurement of the monthly change in the average level of prices at the retail level weighted by the average expenditure pattern of the average person.
<b>Sovereign Issues (Ex UK Gilts)</b>	Bonds issued or guaranteed by nation states but excluding UK government bonds.



<b>Supranational Bonds</b>	Bonds issued by supranational bodies, e.g. European Investment Bank. The bonds – also known as Multilateral Development Bank bonds – are generally AAA rated and behave similarly to gilts, but pay a higher yield (“spread”) given their relative illiquidity when compared with gilts.
<b>Treasury Bill</b>	Treasury bills are short-term debt instruments issued by the UK or other governments. They provide a return to the investor by virtue of being issued at a discount to their final redemption value.